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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001890

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [KDEM](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [PTER](#) [UK](#) [IR](#) [IZ](#) [BA](#)

SUBJECT: DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY'S DECEMBER  
4 MEETING WITH UK FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR SIR NIGEL SHEINWALD

Classified by A/DCM Hallie H. Hahn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary  
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11. (C) Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley met with UK Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Sir Nigel Sheinwald December 4 on the margins of the IISS Gulf Security Dialogue conference in Manama. Sheinwald said that the UK government had solidified around the January 30 date for Iraqi elections. He thought that PM Blair could accept a two to three week extension if the Iraqis could deliver something substantive in return, such as the participation of a major Sunni bloc. Sheinwald expressed concern about being forced to make a public statement about the future of the coalition deployment in Iraq, and wondered if the coalition should get out in front and make a statement willingly. DNSA Hadley thought that a statement would have to be very nuanced, and we stood by our position of staying as long as necessary and not one day more. Any statement of a drawdown of forces should be evidence of success, not an exit. Sheinwald requested USG information that would bolster the Dutch case to have the EU list Hizballah as a terrorist organization, and commented that the Iranians were already saying unhelpful things regarding the nuclear program negotiations. End Summary.

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Stick with January 30  
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12. (C) UK Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Sir Nigel Sheinwald told Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley December 4 that the UK government had solidified around the January 30 date for Iraqi elections. In mid-December, the Iraqis would have to make a final decision about the timing, and Sheinwald wondered if it was worth giving them a few more weeks. DNSA Hadley replied that pressure would come at two separate times: first in mid-December, when the election lists are due, and second in late January, in the final run-up to the elections. We can anticipate PM Allawi saying that he would need a few more months to convince some particular group of Sunnis to participate in the elections. This would put the IIG into a bind because a delay could win some Sunnis but lose a lot of Shia. We would consider postponing the elections only if Allawi makes the request, he can deliver a major group of Sunnis before the election, and doing so will not alienate the Shia and Kurds. But the President and PM Blair, added DNSA Hadley, will want to stick with January 30. Sheinwald responded that Blair would accept a two to three week "once-and-for-all" extension if the Iraqis could deliver something substantive in return. However, a six month delay would "drive him crazy."

13. (C) Sheinwald raised the idea of a conference aimed at getting out the Sunni vote. The latest he had heard was that if a conference took place, it would have to be inside Iraq. Sheinwald suggested that the U.S. and UK should encourage holding a conference, whether inside or outside Iraq. DNSA Hadley replied that the Jordanians, Saudis, and others continued to talk about delaying the elections, but they should be focusing on encouraging the Iraqi Sunnis to participate.

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Shoring Up the Coalition  
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14. (C) Sheinwald said that the UK was concerned with perceptions of the cohesion of the coalition in Iraq. The Dutch are holding firmly to their decision to depart. DNSA Hadley said that the U.S. is dealing with the issue of how to shore up the coalition. The U.S. approached the Ukrainians about their deployment, but they begged off, saying it is a decision "for another day." The United States has some funds available to assist our allies, if necessary. While some participants in the coalition may decrease their troop levels or depart, others may increase their numbers or new countries may join. The numbers are important, but the mix in type of deployments is also. The election results could prompt some partners to reconsider earlier decisions.

15. (C) Sheinwald expressed his surprise that the coalition presence had not become an issue in the Iraqi election campaign. The coalition might have to say something publicly and it would be better to do so willingly and not be forced into a statement. DNSA Hadley said that the formulation of an announcement would have to be very nuanced. We have always said that the U.S. would stay as long as necessary and not one day more. He suggested that we might emphasize the second half of that commitment and tie the drawdown of coalition forces to the development of the Iraqi security services. Any statement the coalition makes should be presented as evidence of success, not an exit. Sheinwald affirmed that the UK does not envision drawing down its forces during 2005, a time when the number of Iraqi forces will be growing. This would mean a net increase in troops on the ground. DNSA Hadley noted that General Abizaid has said that the Iraqi security services should be in the cities, not the coalition. But the challenge with the Iraqis is the lack of leadership and experience. We have to "stiffen" them through training. Sheinwald commented that the Iraqis have courage but are unable to feed or transport themselves.

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Case Against Hizballah  
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16. (C) DNSA Hadley stated that the Dutch are thinking about moving within the EU to have Hizballah listed as a terrorist organization. The United States supports this; Iran and terror is on our agenda. Sheinwald requested that the U.S. share with the Netherlands any information it could release to help make the case against Hizballah in the EU. Regarding EU negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, he said that the two sides will establish working groups by mid-December. He noted, however, that the Iranians are already saying unhelpful things about resolving the issue within six months.

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